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Abstract 
This paper uses household survey panel data of 416 rural households to study livestock asset 
dynamics in the north-east of Ethiopia. The period under examination (1996-2003) was marked 
by severe environmental shocks, including a series of droughts. Using as point of departure the 
literature on the evolution of productive assets in the presence of risk, which relates asset paths 
to initial endowments, we test the hypothesis of wealth divergence and the existence of asset 
poverty traps. Results indicate rather that livestock asset dynamics are marked by convergence 
over time. Examining the role of social capital in recovery and growth of households’ 
endowments, both local social relationships as well as ‘bridging’ social capital seem to have a 
positive effect on asset holdings directly, as well as indirectly by mitigating the impact of income 
shocks on livestock capital. 
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1.  Introduction 
As the literature on environmental and economic shocks in the developing world has 
acknowledged, shocks are often a particularly pernicious phenomenon for the poorest in poor 
countries. With few good options for shielding themselves from the impact of droughts, death of 
an economically active family member, or detrimental price changes, in some cases the poorest 
are said to resort to divesting themselves of their meager assets to stabilize current consumption. 
This however constitutes a heavy compromise on future consumption when what they are forced 
to sell are productive assets, and when market failures and transactions costs mean that 
reaccumulation of assets in good times is extremely difficult. These conditions have inspired 
research into the existence of ‘asset poverty traps’ and the conditions under which low-level 
asset equilibria exist. 
The link between shocks and welfare of the poor has also been approached from a recent 
strand of literature on social capital and development, which has expanded on the insurance role 
of social networks. The argument is made that the poor rely heavily on informal social ties to 
insure themselves against the impact of shocks on their consumption flows, as they usually lack 
access to formal insurance markets or sufficient own savings. 
This paper integrates these issues by investigating two key questions. First, it asks 
whether livestock assets in Ethiopia are characterized by the existence of multiple dynamic 
equilibria, one of which may constitute an asset-poverty trap. Secondly, it examines whether and 
to what extent households’ social capital affects the evolution of livestock asset holdings over 
time. Given the importance of idiosyncratic and covariant shocks for asset dynamics as revealed 
in the theoretical and empirical literature, the role of social capital in mitigating these types of 
shocks in terms of their impact on asset endowments is explored. The rest of this section will  
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briefly discuss existing empirical and theoretical work pertaining to this topic. The next section 
describes the data and the setting. Section 3 traces the series of weather-related shocks that the 
area experienced, as well as describes how livestock assets evolved in the context of these 
shocks. It also gives the landscape of social institutions and social networks that prevail in the 
study area. In Section 4 the model and estimation procedure is specified for examining the key 
hypotheses of this paper, and the results follow in Section 5. The final section concludes. 
 
a.  Shocks and asset poverty traps mytitle2 
Recent empirical work in the developing country context (e.g. Lybbert et al. 2004) has found 
evidence of dynamic asset poverty traps at the micro (household or individual level), manifested 
in tendencies for households with initially relatively large asset holdings to experience an asset 
build-up over time up to some wealth level; conversely, asset poor households are bound to see 
their wealth levels decline toward a stable low level equilibrium. But which forces may underlie 
such asset dynamics? The literature on missing or incomplete credit markets has shown that this 
problem often lies at the heart of multiple dynamic equilibria in asset endowments. Investment in 
capital goods, be they herd, land, or other physical assets require access to credit. There are 
several reasons why such credit  (i) may not be supplied at a price (interest rate) at which making 
the loan would be profitable to the lender (or at least would leave him indifferent), and (ii) is 
especially rationed for low-wealth individuals. When suppliers of capital seek to circumvent the 
information problems which underlie imperfect credit markets through collateral requirements, 
the direct consequence of such contracts is that those with larger initial wealth will be less 
constrained to accessing credit for further investment than those with lower initial wealth. When 
loans obtained are invested and the returns at least partially accumulated, then this together with  
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the information-problem driven necessity for collateral-based lending makes apparent that 
wealthier individuals are better able to accumulate more wealth over time than asset-poorer 
persons.  
This tendency toward greater inequality over time has been found in empirical work that 
also accounted for the influence of shocks on differentially endowed individuals (see for 
example Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993)). Specifically, the use of productive assets to 
smooth consumption in the face of climatic and other shocks when formal insurance markets are 
absent has implications for the time path of these assets (Rosenzweig and Wolpin 1993, Carter 
and May 1999).  
Such explanation of persistent and growing asset inequality over time has been 
challenged by the suggestion that it is the very dimension of time that will allow the asset poor to 
catch up with the asset rich through their ability to save. Carter and Zimmerman (2000) 
contributed to the literature on endowment sensitivity (i.e. the possibility that income distribution 
impacts aggregate welfare) borne of multiple market failures by adding a temporal dimension. 
Under this logic, in a world in which the poor are quantity constrained due to their reduced 
ability to provide collateral in wealth-based credit contracts, through incrementally foregoing 
some consumption from period to period, they can accumulate wealth, invest that wealth, earn 
the returns of which again only a portion is consumed and the rest accumulated, etc. When one 
considers that there are usually diminishing marginal returns to investment, then over time the 
growth of the assets of the initially wealthy will slow down, so that while both the rich and the 
poor may be accumulating assets over time, asset inequality must decline, and not increase.  
Another argument making the case against widening asset inequality, prominently in 
Deaton (1991), suggests that in a dynamic world with risk in the form of stochastic income, even  
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when there is uniformly no access to credit and the only accumulation can take place through 
savings, risk-averse agents need not modify their productive activities so as to reduce their 
income fluctuation. Instead, they can maximize their expected income just like a risk-neutral 
agent would do, and then post facto smooth their consumption through appropriate saving 
behavior.  
While these and other studies constitute a body of literature which delivers conceptual or 
empirically founded arguments that point toward or away from the existence of asset poverty 
traps, there is still surprisingly little research on explicit empirical strategies for identifying the 
existence of asset poverty traps in the microeconomic context (Carter and Barrett 2005 being one 
of the exceptions). The econometric investigation proposed in this paper, accounting both for the 
presence of shocks as well as accumulation of productive assets, examines whether the 
arguments of asset poverty traps and multiple dynamic equilibria hold up or are overturned when 
the shock directly affects the productive investment process. 
 
b.  Social networks as insurance against shocks 
In addition to analyzing wealth dynamics among a poor rural population, and the way that shocks 
may influence these dynamics, the second key goal of this paper is to explore the role of 
households’ social ties and relationships, and the nature of these relationships, for asset holdings 
over time. Economic work on the role of social connectedness for people’s asset accumulation 
pattern, in particular through the function of social capital as insurance against shocks, is still 
very scarce. However, the recent and rising attention to the significance of social relationships 
for economic outcomes, and for economic development in particular, suggests the pertinence of 
this investigation.  
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In most rural economies, social networks play a highly important role in mitigating the 
risks that agricultural households face. With formal insurance and credit markets either absent or 
inaccessible to poor rural agents, the ties of common experience among members of a kinship 
group, ethnic group, or village enable households to transcend some of the information problems 
barring the development of impersonal markets. An often complex system of social exchange is 
an integral part of rural households’ ex ante risk reduction and/or ex post coping strategies. 
Social networks thus serve an important role in resource allocation and risk management, and in 
that sense can be treated as an economic asset.  
Indeed, anthropologists and sociologists have tended to use a broader definition of assets 
than economists, a definition that emphasises the critical role that social relations and networks 
play in periods of economic instability (Berry 1989, Little 1992a). They have shown how 
gender-based associations (Clark 1994; Goheen 1996), kinship groups (Stone, Stone and Netting 
1995), and age-based organizations (Little 1992b) are assets that allow farmers to weather 
periods of climatic and economic turbulence. Oliver-Smith (1996) provides an overview of the 
anthropological treatment of the ways in which communities deal with disaster occurrences. 
Marcel Fafchamps can be counted amongst those economists that have contributed 
importantly to understanding how social bonds play a role in economic outcomes (Fafchamps 
and Minten 1999; Fafchamps 2000). For example, Fafchamps (1992) zeroes in on the mutual 
insurance character of solidarity networks. In this, the person receiving assistance when adverse 
unforeseen events strike him is not expected to give back an equivalent amount to the giver at 
another time, but rather to help others in the network when they are in need. This type of 
transaction has been coined “generalized reciprocity” (Sahlins 1965). The theory of repeated 
games is used to understand the functions of the solidarity network: co-operation can be  
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supported if people interact not in a one-shot fashion, but over a long period of time. And indeed 
a repeated games model is appropriate for weakly mobile people living in close proximity to 
each other. Coate and Ravallion (1993) formalize this game-theoretic framework and measure 
the divergence of the outcome from that of first-best risk sharing. 
While the explanation based on repeated games emphasises how the nature of social 
networks can create the incentives for members to co-operate, and insure other members of the 
group from the effects of risky events through risk-pooling, Stiglitz (1990) and Besley (1995) 
point to the comparative advantage that nonmarket institutions such as solidarity networks have 
in terms of their monitoring and enforcement capacity: Individuals who interact in a variety of 
nonmarket contexts tend to know each other well. Thus, they may have greater ability to monitor 
each other than do formal insurance institutions. Also, given that social networks create 
multifaceted bonds between people that go beyond mutual insuring, mechanisms of social 
control and sanctions exist to limit non-co-operative behaviour. 
These kinds of mutual insurance schemes are presumed to be most effective in the face of 
idiosyncratic risk, such as illness or death of a household member, theft of livestock or other 
assets, etc. Other social mechanisms to deal with this form of risk include intra-village transfers 
of assets or food to the affected household (Carter 1997), or provision of a loan, directly or in the 
form of privileging the afflicted household to receive the payment in a rotating credit group 
(Besley 1995). 
However, social mechanisms also exist in many countries to reduce covariant risk such as 
the adverse economic effects of climatic conditions or social conflict which affect a whole 
village. This issue has hardly been explored in the social capital or the risk literature. Where the 
question receives any mention at all, it is usually suggested that social networks cannot address  
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collectively experienced risk, since shocks that effect one member of a network are likely to 
affect all. This presumes however that social networks are necessarily localized. They may well 
frequently be, given the obvious problems of fostering and maintaining ties over large distances. 
But the existence of social institutions or relationships that traverse space, and their usefulness in 
controlling the effects of covariant shocks for their members, is an empirical question that merits 
attention.  
There have been a few notable exceptions to the dearth of empirical work on this topic. 
Three studies come to mind. Rosenzweig (1988) suggests that kinship ties in India are able to be 
sustained over space and over time in implicit insurance-based transfer schemes which contribute 
to consumption smoothing in the face of covariant income risks. Such social transfer schemes are 
shown to be superior to insurance through (non-socially mediated) credit where risk is spatially 
correlated, due to the difficulties of honoring intertemporal contracts between agents separated 
by long distances. The assumption in much of the economics literature that social networks 
cannot absorb covariant risks is also challenged by Grimard (1997) in his analysis of urban and 
rural households in Côte d’Ivoire. Grimard investigates the hypothesis that households take part 
in spatially diversified risk-sharing arrangements with members of their own ethnic group and 
finds evidence of partial risk-sharing of this nature. Networks bound by ethnicity provide 
diversification of locally covariant risk as these informal arrangements are extended over space. 
Finally, Carter and Maluccio (2003) examine in the case of South Africa whether community 
level social capital may have contributed positively to diminishing exposure to individual 
covariant shocks and find little evidence of an effect on the latter. 
  This paper addresses this sparsely researched subject by distinguishing between two 
different forms of social capital, one of which is more likely to be able to serve as a mechanism  
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to buffer collective risk. In evaluating the dynamics of households’ asset holdings in the presence 
of shocks, it examines whether local and bridging social capital plays a role in protecting these 
assets, both directly, and/or indirectly by limiting the impact of drought shocks on asset wealth. 
 
2.  The Data and Setting 
The South Wollo zone is located in the east of Amhara region of Ethiopia, in the north-centre of 
the country and about 400 kilometers north of Addis Abeba (for map, see Figure 1). The study 
area is close to the trading towns of Dessie, Bati town, and Kolmbocha, and includes the lowland 
locations of Oromiya Zone. The household survey covers three rural weredas (districts) in South 
Wollo Zone (Dessie Zuria, Legambo, and Jemma weredas) and one rural wereda in Oromiya 
Zone (Bati wereda).  
The weredas are generally highly differentiated in terms of agroecology, production 
potential and access to infrastructure. The four agroecological zones that the area spans are (i) 
Wurch (very high altitude, high rainfall, occasional frost), (ii) Dega (high altitude, moist and low 
temperature), (iii) Woine dega (mid-altitude, sub-moist and medium temperature), and (iv) Kolla 
(low-altitude, semi-arid and high temperature). There is also diversity in terms of which growing 
seasons yield the bulk of agricultural production. The two seasons are: Belg (planting in 
February/March and harvesting through June - August), and meher (planting June – August and 
harvesting in November-January). Certain areas receive only meher or belg rains while other 
areas receive both (see Table 1). 
The households in South Wollo Zone are ethnically Amhara, whereas those in Oromiya 
Zone are Oromos. The vast majority of the households in all communities are Muslim, are 
sedentary crop farmers and engage in mixed crop-livestock production. Livestock assets are used  
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in a variety of ways, but predominantly, as an input in crop production (livestock dung is used as 
fertilizer, oxen are used for plowing, etc.). Donkeys and mules are a means of transport of goods 
and sometimes people. Livestock are also a direct source of nutrition, through the milk, eggs, and 
meat they provide, though this function is not as important for these study communities in the 
northern highlands, as they are for pastoralists in the southeast and eastern parts of Ethiopia. 
Livestock trading is also not a dominant activity for the sample households, and only a small 
portion of the households report that livestock fattening and selling constitutes a key livelihood. 
The panel data resulted from a rural household survey conducted in seven rounds over the 
period of June 2000 – July 2003 in South Wollo/Oromiya Zones. In addition to the seven time 
periods, recall questions captured the households’ livestock holdings for the years 1996 through 
1999, resulting in an additional four rounds of data on herd assets. Initially, 448 households in 
rural areas were sampled using a stratified sampling technique, in which from the four above 
mentioned weredas, which were selected to ensure agroclimatic diversity, two kebeles each were 
randomly selected. Finally, from each kebele, 56 households were randomly sampled. From the 
448 households of the first round, 416 remained in the last round. The rate of attrition over these 
time periods followed the traditional pattern in which attrition increases at a decreasing rate. So 
93% of the original households remain for analysis, which constitutes a relatively low attrition 
rate for this type of survey.  
 
3.  Weather Shocks, Livestock, and Social Relations in South Wollo 
This section provides a description of the nature and timing of the weather-related shocks 
households experienced in South Wollo in the late ’90s and early part of this decade. This will be 
overlaid by a brief account of the evolution of households’ asset endowments in the form of  
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livestock (and oxen in particular) for the same time period. Finally, a sketch of the key social 
institutions and extra-village social ties that sample households reported will follow, which 
provides some background for the empirical approach to assessing social capital as a determinant 
of asset holdings in the face of the drought shocks. 
 
a. The impact of climatic conditions 1999-2003 mytitle2 
In the decade from the mid-1990s until today the study area of eastern Amhara Region in 
Ethiopia (South Wollo zone and Oromiya zone) has experienced multiple and prolonged 
droughts and other weather shocks. The massive failure of the short rainy season (belg) in the 
first half of 1999, however, has stood out in this period. National and regional estimates for food 
relief in 1999 were drastically altered when it was observed that the belg season of 1999 was 
going to be an almost complete disaster. Out of the eight kebeles [1], or peasant associations, that 
comprise the survey area, four rely heavily on the belg growing season (see Table 1).  
The shortages created by this failure were compounded by poor rains of the long rainy 
season (meher) in the latter half of the same year. The 1999 meher season yielded only about 
40% of normal harvests in six of the eight study kebeles (Little et al. 2005).  By August 1999 
about 90% of the households in the study region were receiving food aid, with the exception of 
the Jemma district which did not suffer crop losses of great severity. Recovery from the 1999 
weather shocks was hampered by the fact that the belg season of 2000 was also very poor (75% 
reduction of normal yields), even though the long-rain meher season during that year was only 
slightly below normal yields. With massive imports of food aid and the recovery of the long 
rains in 2000, the nutritional status of the area’s population had somewhat recovered by August 
2000.  Thus, the drought of 1999 was a slowly developing event that reached a crisis by March  
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1999.  It was keyed by the failure or near failure of three successive short rainy seasons of the 
years 1998, ’99 and ’00. Thus it was mainly those areas which depend heavily on the belg season 
that suffered the most (especially Dessie Zuria and Legambo districts in the study region).   
Table 1, which draws on data from the household survey, gives some indication of the 
impact of rainfall and other shocks on the different kebeles for the subsequent years. Especially 
the long rains of 2001 appear to have provided a reprieve for South Wollo households, although 
it is mostly those in the Jemma and Bati areas that reported dramatically reduced crop losses in 
this period, with improvement in crop failure more modest for the originally hardest hit Legambo 
and Dessie Zuria households.  
 
 b.  The evolution of livestock assets among rural households in South Wollo mytitle2 
There is wide acknowledgement in the literature that populations in agricultural and agropastoral 
areas in developing countries draw on their livestock assets to overcome food crises arising from 
climatic and other shocks, although there is also work that places in doubt that livestock sale is 
an important coping strategy in times of stress (Fafchamps, Udry and Czukas 1998). Awareness 
of the sequence of droughts in South Wollo in the late 1990s and early years of this decade, and 
the fact that livestock is an important part of households’ wealth in this area, motivates a closer 
examination of how livestock assets have evolved over time in light of the prevalence of shocks 
and a lack of fully adequate formal or informal insurance mechanisms. 
Figures 2a and 2b track average oxen and livestock levels over time for wealth quartiles 
based on the initial period. These figures display an interesting trend from 1996 to 2003. First of 
all, for the period 1997 through 1999, we find that the asset-richer households appear to have 
experienced a steady decline in both livestock holdings in general, and also oxen holdings in  
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particular. On the other hand, the asset poorest have seen an increase in their livestock holdings 
over the same period. As the figures categorize households by livestock ownership quartiles, we 
can see that across all four quartiles, there appears to be a negative relationship between initial 
(1996) holdings and changes in holdings. Comparing oxen assets and livestock assets in general, 
we find that the changes described above are more pronounced for livestock as a whole, which 
have been aggregated using Tropical Livestock Units [2], than for oxen. This seems to be 
particularly true for the wealthiest households. 
This may suggest that they divested themselves first of other animals before disposing of 
oxen (or to the extent that the fall in animal holdings is due to death of the animals, that they 
gave priority to their oxen in terms of feed and other care to increase their oxen’s survival 
chances).  
1999 has been a year in which both the belg and the meher seasons brought severe 
drought upon the population in South Wollo, as detailed in the previous subsection.  The data on 
asset holdings from 1996 to 1999 help us see the position that households held in terms of animal 
wealth prior to this devastating drought period. Figures 2a and 2b show, however, that the herd 
size (both oxen and livestock in general) held by households did not yet reach a trough in 1999, 
from which they gradually recovered. In fact, the poorest, who have been holding on to their 
small holdings up to 1999 finally also faced diminishing assets in the year after the severe 
drought (Figure 2b). For oxen, the fall continues for most households through the end of the year 
2000, as can be seen from Figure 2a, whereas the latter half of 2000 already constitutes the first 
recovery period for livestock in general.  
The continued decline after ’99 may be attributable to an indirect effect as a consequence 
of the failed belg and meher seasons of that year: With failed crops resulting in a stark fall in  
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households’ normal source of consumption, they may have sought to stabilize their consumption 
by drawing down their livestock. This could occur by either slaughtering and eating livestock 
that are otherwise held as capital goods (as a store of wealth or a source of income through 
livestock products and services such as transportation, plowing, milk, etc.), or selling them on 
the market to buy grain foods.  
Unfortunately the first five rounds have only information on herd stocks and do not cover 
the nature of changes in these stocks, such as animal deaths, etc. This would have enabled us to 
assess the immediate toll, in terms of deaths, that the 1999 belg and meher seasons’ drought took 
on households’ livestock. However, panel data on such livestock transactions are available for 
the period starting December 2000, so we can at least examine which types of changes in 
livestock holdings are most responsible for this further draw-down from June to December 2000 
and beyond.  
Figures 3a-c track the net forms of accumulation by initial wealth of households. As 
expected, excess births over deaths are highest for the initially wealthiest quartile nearly 
throughout the entire three-year period, and they are lowest for the asset-poorest quarter of 
households. Interestingly, a similar pattern is observed for market based de-accumulation, 
livestock sales net of purchases. Net sales are low but steadily increasing for the group of 
initially poorest households, and is relatively high for the richest group. Net borrowing is quite 
small in magnitude for all household groups, but it appears that mostly the middle-range 
households are borrowing from the wealthiest as changes in the formers’ net borrowing moves 
counter to changes in net borrowing by the wealthiest quartile. 
In sum, it can be said that while we do not have herd transaction data for the time period 
in which a form of convergence may be most dramatically observed, 1996 to 1999, wealth- 
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differentiated behavior after this period in terms of livestock sales and purchases, borrowing and 
lending, and experience with animal births and deaths suggests that a higher rate of net sales by 
those with initially greater assets may be the main contributor to asset convergence across time, 
with convergence checked somewhat by virtue of the fact that wealthy households experience 
asset increases from high natural growth in stocks, a source of growth that appears to be 
important in overall livestock accumulation. This at least tentatively suggests that less poor 
households could afford to engage in consumption-smoothing behavior, ensuring a more steady 
stream of consumption at the expense of drawing down on their wealth, whereas the poorest 
quartile, owning on average less than one TLU, refrained on disposing of their already minimal 
holdings. 
 
c.  Social capital and social institutions mytitle22 
In the South Wollo area there are a variety of social institutions that are diverse in purpose, 
membership size, and importance in communities. The institution that is the most ubiquitous is 
the kire (also referred to as iddir in some kebeles, although there are some differences between 
kire and what is usually meant by iddir in the study area), which has as its main function the 
provision of financial and in-kind support for a household in which a family member or a key 
animal such as an ox dies or has to be slaughtered.  
The assistance usually takes the form of  coverage of funeral costs in the case of a 
household member. In the case of livestock, the iddir/kire members buy the meat of the 
slaughtered ox from the household, and sometimes lend to the household for free an ox for 
plowing land for one season, so that the asset loss does not result in an income shock for that 
season. However, the economic strain to the household upon the death of an economically active  
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household member, or the consequences of the death of an ox after the current season, are not 
necessarily relieved through kire support. In some villages in the study area, the kire also 
functions as an institution that resolves conflict between neighbours and within the village in 
general. 
In those kebeles with a sizeable Christian population, the mehaber and the senbete, which 
are religious institutions, are present. These institutions have no explicitly economic or insurance 
purpose; their main function is to create and strengthen ties between Christians. In the case of the 
senbete, members rotate in bringing food and drinks to be consumed by the priests after mass 
each week, and mehaber members seek to honor the saints by gathering at a member’s house on 
a saint’s day every month, with the (rotating) host providing food for the guests.  
  Two other important community based institutions are debo and wonfel. These have as 
their prime purpose the exchange of labor support on the farm, especially during harvest. Debo is 
a form of festive labour, where a person will provide food and drink for a large work party in 
order to carry out a time-sensitive agricultural task. No reciprocity is expected. Wonfel on the 
other hand involves smaller work parties, usually with the direct expectation of reciprocity 
among the members. People practice reciprocal labor to plant and harvest in a timely fashion, 
thus limiting the risk of crop loss. Wonfel is more common than debo, as can be seen in Table 2. 
In addition to these social groups, in which participation ranges from widespread (e.g. 
kire) to moderate (e.g. debo), there are also some institutions such as the iqqub that are more 
exclusive in the context of rural South Wollo. A form of rotating savings and credit association, 
the iqqub consists of members who know each other very well, as a substantial amount of trust 
and information about a person’s reliability is necessary for the financial transactions that take 
place in such a group to proceed smoothly. In the South Wollo study region such activities are  
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rarer than in urban areas, usually because the necessary frequent contributions to the pool may be 
too large for the very poor, require having savings in the form of cash, and adherence to a strict 
contribution schedule on a weekly or monthly basis prevents using resources flexibly in order to 
cover food or other shortages in the face of a shock.  
The value of such ties for mutual insurance, then, may arise more or less directly from the 
purpose of the social institution in question, such as in the case of labor pooling groups like 
wonfel and debo. Or it may establish itself indirectly as households are more likely to have 
success calling on others to help them get through shortages if they know these people have ties 
with them that go beyond mutual assistance agreement.  
To the extent that these shocks are covariant, there usually must exist some degree of 
diversity among households tied to each other through the bonds of social institutions or other 
social relations for these relations to be useful as an insurance mechanism. Section 1b discussed 
one source of diversity, namely spatial distance (see also Table 4). Another source is differences 
between households in economic activity, as a particular form of shock may affect one economic 
activity more than another. We are able to capture the former from the household survey, while 
lack of information about characteristics (other than location) of people the households are 
socially connected to prohibits direct testing of the hypothesis that social networks diverse in 
livelihood are more valuable as source of insuring against covariant shocks. 
 
4.  Variables, Model Specification and Estimation Procedure 
This section lays out the conceptual empirical framework for addressing the questions posed at 
the outset: Do asset paths in northern Ethiopia reflect the existence of multiple dynamic 
equilibria, one of which constitutes an asset poverty trap? And: To what extent does households’  
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social capital affect the evolution of livestock asset holdings over time and pose a buffer against 
idiosyncratic and covariant risk? 
Figure 4 constitutes one way in which asset dynamics can be illustrated and analyzed, 
and the findings of this paper will later be represented in similar asset-space [3]. The graph maps 
expected future assets of households against current asset holdings. This solid curve suggests the 
existence of multiple dynamic equilibria, pointing to an increasingly unequal wealth distribution 
over time, as well as the existence of an ‘asset poverty trap’. For households with low asset 
endowments (between A
lo and A
thr) in the current period, expected asset holdings in the next 
period will fall.  
On the other hand, relatively wealthier households (with assets between A
thr and A
hi) can 
expect to have even greater wealth in the future. If asset paths follow this pattern, then there is an 
unstable wealth equilibrium, A
thr, that can be identified as a threshold level such that if a shock or 
other occurrence pushes a household with assets slightly above A
thr to wealth below that 
threshold, it can expect to face a decline over time toward a substantially lower endowment 
level, A
lo, which can be described as an asset poverty trap. Barring this shock, the household’s 
endowments would have instead converged toward the high stable equilibrium asset level, A
hi. In 
contrast to this scenario, if instead asset paths are better represented by the dashed curve, neither 
the proposition of expanding wealth inequality over time, nor that of the existence of multiple 
dynamic equilibria with a divergence-inducing asset threshold can be made as immediately. 
There are important implications that arise from the nature of asset dynamics in 
developing countries. If, for example, there is evidence of multiple dynamic equilibria of the 
type represented by the solid curve in Figure 4, there is a case to be made that policy 
interventions that seek to limit the erosion of household assets in poor communities place a  
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relatively large emphasis on helping households in the middle asset range (around A
thr) protect or 
enhance their wealth holdings. On the other hand, if wealth evolution is more accurately 
characterized by the dashed curve, a focus away from the lowest-wealth and toward less poor 
households in asset building interventions is less easily justified. 
 
a. Variables and Structural model 
The data set provides variables that allow us to distinguish different facets of social ties. 
In particular, a useful way to classify (the economic value of) social relationships, especially in 
this context, rests on the different forms of insurance that such relationships may be able to 
provide. One type measures the extent to which a household is strongly connected with others 
within the village, presumably with other households which share similar social characteristics 
and livelihoods, which allows stronger bonds to develop. This can be termed ‘bonding’ social 
capital. The other measure establishes the reach of social ties: how spatially far-flung a 
household’s connections with others are. This refers to ‘bridging’ social capital. 
The first set of relationships may help a household when it is struck by an individual 
shock. On the other hand, having geographically dispersed ties may become useful when the 
household’s asset base is affected by covariant shocks that reduce incomes of many others in the 
community. Two key dummy variables will serve as proxies for different types of  social capital. 
The first captures whether any member of a given household participates in a social institution. 
These include the religious institutions senbete and mehaber, the burial society iddir or kire, 
rotating savings and credit societies (iqqub), and labor parties (debo and wonfel), and whether 
they have either received or provided credit to either family members, other kinfolk, neighbors, 
or social institutions such as iddir and iqqub. The second variable proxies bridging social capital.  
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It captures if the household either received or sent remittances to other people located far away, 
and if it offered or received any other form of assistance to/from people who reside outside of the 
household’s village. 
We considered also using information that reflects a household’s investment in social 
capital, drawing on data on household expenditures on social activities such as wedding, funeral, 
religious festivities, etc. However, this kind of measure has critical problems. It may be too 
closely related to income measures, and instrumenting it using variables other than the social 
capital measures above (since it is their impact on assets that is of interest) proved difficult since 
no suitable variables are available. But more importantly, expenditure data is available for too 
few of the rounds to be able to derive certain postestimation statistics that are critical to the 
empirical analysis (discussed in the next section). Finally, the link between social investment and 
social capital is not necessarily a linear or proportional one (see Mogues and Carter (2006)). 
In order to test the hypotheses laid out in Section 1 and illustrated by the figure above, we 
use a dynamic model that controls for household heterogeneity: 








iv ivt S L L η ηL S y y ε α α γ φ + + + + + + + = −






with   0 ) ( = ivt E ε ,  0 ) ( = jws ivt E ε ε  ∀ i≠j or t≠s, 
2 ) var( ε σ ε = ivt , 
where yivt is the stock of animal assets (aggregated using Tropical Livestock Unit (TLU) factors) 
that household i in village v holds at time t; S is one of the measures of social capital; 
h
ivt L  and 
v
ivt L  refer to variables that correspond respectively to idiosyncratic and covariant shocks, as will 
be elaborated in Section 5b below; and xivt is a vector of other control variables.  
The choice of transformations of the one-period lag used in this model reflects the 
minimum-order polynomial necessary to test for the presence of a nonlinear asset path as shown  
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in Figure 4. More specifically, of interest here is to determine whether indeed there is at least one 
high and one low level stable equilibrium along with one unstable equilibrium, which constitutes 
the threshold asset level such that, if a household falls below this threshold, its livestock assets 
can be expected to decline over time toward the low stable level. Such dynamic equilibria exist if 








1 2 1 1 + + + − = − − − ivt ivt ivt y y y γ γ γ  (2) 
where  ivt z ~  incorporates all the terms other than those involving livestock assets. Consistent 
estimation of (1) using a procedure detailed in 5b below will produce the estimated coefficients 
and therefore estimates of these roots. As Figure 4 makes clear, the divergence/poverty trap 
hypothesis requires that  
1 3 2
2
1 3 1 2 1 ≤ + + − − ivt ivt y y γ γ γ  (3) 
evaluated at some small and some higher root, and  
1 3 2
2
1 3 1 2 1 ≥ + + − − ivt ivt y y γ γ γ  (4) 
evaluated at a root located between the previous two, if at least three roots exist. If there are only 
two roots, it is only necessary to find condition (4) at some root and (3) at the other. Finally, if 
there is only one root and (4) holds there, one can expect divergence in asset holdings and 
increased asset inequality over time. If on the other hand (3) holds there, that suggests, at the 
observed wealth levels in the study area, convergence over time toward a stable equilibrium. In 
the latter case, this equilibrium can be estimated and compared against livestock asset holdings 
that are deemed to represent an asset poverty line for a rural economy such as South Wollo. 
Given the time path of livestock assets described in this model, a positive effect of a 
household’s social capital on livestock holdings, i.e. α>0, would suggest that the dynamic 
relationship mapped in Figure 4 would be shifted upward, indicated by the dashed curve. This  
 
22
means that with strong social ties and relationships, a household’s asset growth (loss) over time 
will be larger (smaller). This however also has implications for the equilibria, as seen in the 
figure. The stable equilibria are both higher, and the unstable threshold equilibrium would be 
lower. The latter means that in the presence of high social capital, a household is less likely to 
find itself on the downward-spiraling asset path as it takes having a lower herd stock to cross the 
threshold that leads to the asset poverty trap. 
Also of particular interest here is how social capital may or may not help households 
protect their assets in the face of shocks. Therefore, Sivt is interacted with the idiosyncratic and 
the covariant shock variables 
h
ivt L  and 
v
ivt L . In particular, variables measuring ‘bridging’ social 
capital are interacted with measures of covariant shock to be able to examine if indeed bridging 
social capital is able to mitigate the detrimental effect of negative covariant shocks on assets. 
Similarly, measures of bonding social capital are interacted with the income shock variables, as 
their effect on limiting exposure to risk, if there is such an effect, would be predominantly 
present with respect to individually experienced risk. 
 
b.  Estimation Procedure mytitle22 
The choice between modeling the unobserved φi as a fixed unknown parameter versus as a 
random variable is made based on a number of factors.[4] The fact that we are interested in 
making inferences about the population from which the sample is based would suggest a random 
effects approach, as well as the fact that a fixed effects model makes impossible the estimation of 
certain variables of interest that may be time-invariant. Also, given that the estimation of the 
individual effects themselves is not of interest to the research questions at hand (however, the 
first moment of their distribution is, as will be clear in the discussion of the results), treating φi as  
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a random variable means that the estimation procedure will not entail a loss in a lot of degrees of 
freedom and the concomitant loss in efficiency in estimating the other parameters, especially 
given this data structure with relatively fewer time periods and a large cross-section.  
However, a traditional random effects estimation imposes a restriction on the explanatory 
variables that naturally cannot hold in a dynamic specification, namely that of strict exogeneity. 
At least as important a criterion for ruling out a random effects estimation arises from the 
question whether there is reason to suspect that unobserved heterogeneity captured by φi may be 
correlated with one or more of the regressors. While in many applications this is a significant 
possibility, in a dynamic model it is once again a certainty, to the extent that the effect helps 
explain the dependent variable. 
An estimation method that avoids having to treat φi as a fixed effect and yet produces 
consistent and efficient estimators has been suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). It involves 
first-differencing in order to remove the unobserved household-specific effect, and the use of 
instruments for those variables, including the lagged dependent variable, that cannot be assumed 
to be strictly exogenous. For easy illustration of this procedure, we will group the variables, 
referred to as wit and the lagged livestock variable 
k
it y , into those for which the looser 
assumption of sequential exogeneity conditional on the unobserved effect will be used — that is, 
after accounting for household-specific effects, the error term is uncorrelated with current or past 
values of the explanatory variables, but may be correlated with their future values — and those 
that will be taken to be strictly exogenous (zit), i.e.  
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The choice of instruments at time t is guided by candidate instruments’ lack of correlation with 
the error term, strong correlation with the variables to be instrumented for, and limiting loss in 
degrees of freedom. The latter is an issue in panel data since the transformations of the lagged 
dependent variables are well instrumented for by further lags (or their differenced counterparts). 
This however limits the number of periods that will be actually available in the panel data 
estimation. Fortunately, the dataset has available four periods on livestock assets followed by 
another seven periods of a more complete panel, as discussed in Section 3b. Therefore, these four 
periods’ worth of livestock information serve well as a source of instruments while their use as 
instruments do not remove time periods from the panel data estimation. The other sequentially 
exogenous variables wit can also be instrumented by their own lags as well as the vector zit. 
Instruments are employed using the generalized method of moments system. 
 
5.  Results mytitle2 
a. Nonparametric estimation of asset dynamics mytitle22 
First, a nonparametric estimation of the dynamic path of livestock asset holdings allows us to 
make an initial exploration of the relationship of assets over time before imposing parametric 
structure. In order to examine the impact of current on future asset ownership for different 
stretches of time, two estimations of the following model are conducted: 
yit = g
(j)(yit-j) + εit  (7)  
in which j=1 and j=3, that is, the impact is assessed of current on future asset holdings one time 
period and three time periods later. g
(j)( ) is estimated using the LOESS method, a regression by  
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local fitting, in which for each value 
0
j it y −  the observations that are in the neighborhood of 
0
j it y −  
are used to predict 
0
it y  by minimizing a weighted average of squared residuals, where the weights 
vary inversely with the distance of each observation from
0
j it y − . [5] 
The results are shown in Figure 5, where the solid curve represents the one-period and the 
dashed curve the three-period relationship. Figure 5 suggests a dynamic relationship that is not 
characterized by divergence arising from an asset threshold such that households which find 
themselves above this threshold will move to a high stable equilibrium and those that fall below 
the threshold will tend to move to a lower-level equilibrium. Instead what this nonparametric 
estimation shows is a situation of convergence over time. Given that the curve intersects the 45
o 
line once and from above, there is only one stable equilibrium toward which even the initially 
asset-rich will be pulled over time.  
The dashed line representing the more long-term of current and future assets is even 
flatter, suggesting that this trend is even more pronounced over longer periods of time. The 
stable equilibrium in the larger lag estimation is at the same level as that indicated by the short-
lag estimation, around 3 ½ TLUs. 
 
b.  Parametric estimation of asset dynamics mytitle22 
This bivariate relationship over time, however, hides the potential impact of other key variables 
that could be underlying households’ asset accumulation and decumulation decisions, as well as 
exogenous factors that directly determine livestock size, such as weather and other shocks. 
Therefore, we model the time evolution of livestock in the context of these variables. As 
mentioned, of special interest is the extent to which covariant and idiosyncratic shocks as well as 
social capital may affect assets.  
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Tables 5a and 5b give the results of the dynamic panel estimation, with the former 
including direct social network effects on assets, and the latter including indirect effects, through 
potential mitigation of the impact of shocks on assets. Specification A in Table 5a includes only 
a 3
rd order polynomial function of lagged assets as explanatory variables (drawn in Figure 6), to 
serve as a comparison with the nonparametric estimation displayed in Figure 5. The dashed steep 
curve shows a similar scenario of convergence over time of households’ livestock holdings 
toward a stable equilibrium, even though this equilibrium is somewhat higher in the case of the 
parametric estimation (at approximately 4.2 TLUs). As can be seen from the lagged livestock 
coefficients of the full regressions, columns B through E, including the effect of key variables 
such as land holdings, shocks, and food aid dramatically transforms the pure effect of previous 
livestock levels on current ones. As can be seen, much of the relative persistence of asset stocks 
reflected in the omitted variables regression of the first column is removed after controlling for 
these factors.  
This can be better seen graphically. The solid curve in Figure 6 presents the dynamic 
asset path having accounted for other assets, food aid, etc. This is a graphical representation for 
the specification that includes covariant shocks, individual shocks, and bridging social capital 
(column C(ii) of Table 5a). Therefore, holding the levels and impact of other variables constant 
across households, next period’s assets are much more similar across households with very 
different asset holdings this period. Thus, a much stronger and speedier convergence toward the 
stable equilibrium asset level is suggested by this model. We can therefore conclude that the 
relative persistence of livestock holdings over time is greatly accounted for by the way that 
factors such as access to food aid, integration in village social networks and social relationships 
beyond the village, and experience of shocks of the household as well as of others in its  
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community are distributed across households with different livestock asset endowments. 
Controlling for other variables in this way also leads to a decrease in the estimated dynamic fixed 
point of assets to 3.9 TLUs, i.e. a decrease by 0.3 TLUs, which is equivalent for example to three 
goats. 
In specification B, risk with an idiosyncratic component is captured by a dummy variable 
whether the household suffered significant crop loss on any of its land parcels for reasons such as 
drought, frost, crop disease, etc. While some of these reasons given reflect a covariant exogenous 
shock, this variable captures the individually experienced impact. For example, within the same 
village at some point in time not all households report crop losses. A one-period lag of this 
measure is used as it is expected that the impact on livestock may not be immediate, as 
households may resort to other coping mechanisms before resorting to selling or otherwise 
drawing down on their livestock assets following crop losses. Also included is the measure of 
‘bonding’ social capital described earlier. The effect on livestock assets of belonging to social 
and informal groups, holding prior herd size constant, is positive and very significant. Belonging 
to social groups increases livestock endowment by 0.22 TLUs. It is useful to keep in mind that 
this impact is present after controlling for last period’s livestock endowments. 
This can be compared with the case in which the effect of the covariant shocks and of 
‘bridging’ social capital on livestock is examined, which specifications C do. CovShock 
measures for each time period the share of households in the village who have reported suffering 
a crop loss, obtained after excluding household i. The variable measuring the (lagged) collective 
crop loss experience shows a strong negative effect on assets, and the additional inclusion of the 
individual shock in (C(ii) vis-à-vis C(i)) leaves this effect unchanged, while the idiosyncratic  
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effect is now weak and insignificant. This points to the notion that after accounting for village 
shocks, the idiosyncratic component of the crop loss shock becomes much less important. 
Specifications in C also include a dummy variable that indicates active linkages to other 
people outside the village. This includes both people living in remote areas from whom the 
household receives remittances, as well as people far away to whom the household makes 
transfers, and also cases in which one or more household members spend most of the year in 
further away locations outside of the village. The impact of such distant social networks is larger 
than the more traditional measure of social capital (through village groups), as a comparison 
across Table 5a shows. 
To examine more explicitly the question whether social capital reduces the impact of 
idiosyncratic and covariant shocks, specifications D and E in Table 5b include interactions of the 
idiosyncratic shock variables with ‘bonding’ social capital, and the covariant shock variables 
with ‘bridging’ social capital. Once again, local social capital in the form of membership or 
participation in local groups appears to mitigate the impact that idiosyncratic income shocks 
have on livestock holding. Again, having geographically dispersed networks reduces to an even 
larger extent the degree to which collective exogenous shocks result in reduced livestock wealth 
[6]. 
 
c. Social capital and the evolution of livestock holdings mytitle22 
Having discussed the role of having different types of social networks for asset endowments, 
directly and indirectly through its shock-mitigating influence, we want to return to the dynamic 
asset path and ask how the impact of social capital on the evolution of livestock assets over time 
may be understood.   
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In the model (1) social capital affects not the impact (slope) of past on future herd 
endowments, but the level of this relationship. To see the extent to which belonging to village 
level social groups (or having active relationships with people in remote areas) changes future 
livestock holdings given past endowments, we use the estimates of specifications B and C(ii) to 








= ∑ + = γ  (8) 
where SHsk is the intercept, or shifter. Two cases are used: one in which the dummy variable for 
social capital is set to 0, and the other where it is set to 1, so that the two shifters are: 
β ' xit ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
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and  
β ' xit ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ
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 i.e. the pooled mean of the variable, and α is the coefficient for the 
social capital dummy variable. The shift in the dynamic asset relationship resulting from an 
increase in the social capital variable from zero to one, again given model C(ii), implies, as 
described in the model specification in Section 4a, a change in the stable equilibrium. 
Specifically, the stable equilibrium for a household with relationships to distant people is 
4.2 TLUs, versus the equilibrium if it does not have such relationships (3.8 TLUs). The 
difference in equilibria here, 0.4, is larger than the shift itself, which amounts to the size of the 
marginal effect α ˆ , (0.3 TLUs) given that relationship between yit-1 and yit is positive and has 
little curvature in the neighborhood of the equilibria. Hence, whether one measures the social 
networks effect in the standard way, i.e. the coefficient, or by quantifying how it affects the  
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equilibrium level of assets in a dynamic asset path, this impact appears to be large relative to 
average livestock wealth in the study area. 
 
6.  Concluding remarks mytitle2 
Over the period of the latter half of the 1990s until the early 2000s, rural households in the north-
east of Ethiopia have experienced dramatic changes in their livestock holdings. This period was 
also marked by severe as well as repeated events of poor or untimely rains, including three 
successive failed short-rain (belg) seasons in 1998-2000. Given the importance of livestock in 
households’ capital endowment set, we set out to investigate the nature of livestock asset 
dynamics in the presence of weather shocks.  
Of interest was to test the hypothesis, as found in part of the literature on assets and 
shocks, that missing financial and other key input markets in developing countries lead to a 
process of divergence of wealth and increasing asset inequality. In the context of South Wollo, 
we find instead that livestock assets exhibit convergent tendencies. This finding may be driven in 
large part by more well endowed households engaging in consumption smoothing by drawing 
down on their herd in times of food shortages while asset poorer households may choose not to 
divest themselves of their already small livestock holdings if they have reason to fear that 
reacquisition of even these low levels of animal capital will be slow and/or very costly. Such 
asset smoothing behavior would then come at the expense of high consumption fluctuation 
unless other smoothing strategies are available to them. Unfortunately, for the period that is most 
responsible for the convergent process, 1996-2000, there is only animal stock data available, but 
not the source of animal additions and deductions (purchases, deaths, etc.), which would have  
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permitted a more in depth examination of the causes of the strongly wealth differentiated 
accumulation behavior observed.  
In contrast to these results, work by Chris Barrett and co-authors on livestock dynamics 
among pastoralists in Ethiopia (see for example Lybbert et al. 2004) finds evidence of nonlinear 
asset equilibria resulting in divergence of assets. One of the factors behind this contrast in findings 
may be how the different production technologies interact with covariant shocks. In Lybbert et al., 
mobile herding requires a large enough herd size as nomadic pastoralists must rely predominantly 
on milk and other livestock products for consumption. Pastoralists falling below the threshold herd 
size and thus taking up sedentary production are more subject to drought shocks, which erode their 
livestock assets even further. Here, sedentary farmers with livestock assets much smaller on 
average than pastoralists, do not enjoy this type of gain from having more livestock on the margin. 
In this sense, it may well be that the households in this study are all in the bottom range of the 
stylized asset path in Figure 4. This hypothesis can naturally not be tested with the data at hand, 
but an interesting area for future research would be to explore more deeply the possible drivers 
behind different dynamic wealth paths. 
This paper also finds that the evolution of assets over time is influenced importantly by the 
extent to which households are embedded in institutional as well as more informal social 
relationships. A differentiation is made in this analysis between local forms of social capital, that 
is, social ties that are mostly limited to others within the village, and ‘bridging’ social capital that 
reflects how far-flung these social connections are. Holding past assets constant, bridging social 
capital has a positive effect on current asset levels by mitigating the impact of income shocks on 
livestock capital.   
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These findings contradict standard assumptions about social capital, namely that it has no 
role to play in mitigating the consequences of covariant risk. To begin with, unfortunately, this 
issue is hardly seriously explored in the social capital or the risk literature. Underlying this 
assumption is likely a conception of social networks as necessarily always village or other highly 
localized institutions. This may well be the more common form in which social networks manifest 
themselves. Nevertheless, where people consciously forge ties across geographic space, or may be 
connected to others far away through the bonds of ethnicity or other strong social affiliations, the 
assumption would no longer hold. In such cases, a distinction of local from bridging forms of 
capital — as is done in this paper — is called for to seriously address the empirical question of the 
usefulness of social mechanisms for coping with covariant shocks. 
With risk (of which weather risk is but one form) being an integral part of rural life in 
Ethiopia and indeed many rural areas of poor countries, and with very limited ways to insure 
against risk, it is important to gain a better grasp of how social connectedness contributes to 
protecting assets from becoming eroded by shocks. Our results were not necessarily expected, 
since in earlier qualitative work in the study area (Castro et al. 1999) informants suggested that 
severe food shortages borne of droughts have themselves led to an erosion of social institutions as 
participation declined when households were searching for ways to economize. There well may be 
a threshold degree of exposure up to which being able to draw on others’ help can be mutually 
beneficial, but beyond which social mechanisms break down. Explicit attention to these issues in 
empirical projects is warranted to get a richer understanding of the role of social capital as a risk-
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Table 1: Agroclimatic characteristics of study villages 
% of households that  







ecological zone  Dec00   Jun 01   Dec01   Mar02 
Chachato Bati 
Meher (long rain 
season) only  Kolla (lowlands)  81.8  83.6     5.5  94.6 
Kamme Bati  Meher  only  Kolla  88.9  88.9  48.2  94.4 
Tulu Mojo  Jemma  Meher only  Dega (highlands)  98.1  98.1    1.9  88.5 
Yedo  Jemma  Meher only  Dega  96.0  96.0    6.0  74.0 
Tebasit Dessie  Zuria 
Belg (short rain 
season) only  Dega  80.9  80.9  85.1  89.4 
Gerado  Dessie Zuria  Both seasons 
Woine dega 
(midlands)  96.2 96.2  88.5  94.2 
Tach Akesta  Legambo  Both seasons  Dega  85.2  85.2  61.1  72.2 
Temu Legambo  Belg  only 
Wurch (afroalpine 
areas) 84.6  84.6  69.2  80.8 
Total 89.0  89.2  45.7  86.0 
 
Table 2: Number of household memberships / participation in community groups and institutions 
Community organizations 
Iddir/Kire (burial society)  327 
Mehaber (religious association)  17 
Senbete (religious association)  8 
Debo (labor party)  108 
Wonfel (labor exchange group)  293 
Formal institutions   
NGO 125 
Service cooperative  57 
Governmental group  4 
Rural credit association  3 
Milisha 1  
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Table 3: Agents to whom survey households provided or from whom they received loans  
  (% of all credit transactions) 
Transaction partner      Dec 00     Jun 01 
Family 23.6%  19.4% 
Other kin  19.0%  29.6% 
Iddir/Iqqub 0.5%  0.0% 
Neighbors 1.0%  14.3% 
Money lender  19.0%  16.3% 
Trader 0.5%  4.1% 
NGO 21.5%  8.2% 
Bank 6.2%  0.0% 
Others 5.6%  1.0% 




Table 4: Agents to whom any household member sent remittances or from whom they  
            received remittances (% of all remittances) 
 
Relationship to the household head      Dec 00      Jun 01 
Spouse 4.3%   
Child   17.2% 
Grandchild 52.2%  5.2% 
Nephew/niece 4.3%  12.1% 
Neighbor   1.7% 
Other    34.8%  19.0% 
Aunt/Uncle   1.7% 
Parent   25.9% 
Sibling 4.3%  17.2% 
Residence of sender / receiver   
Outside Ethiopia  50.0%  35.9% 
Addis Abeba  12.5%  2.6% 





Table 5a: Arellano-Bond estimation of livestock asset holdings, including direct effect of social 
assets on livestock assets 
 
 A  B  C(i)  C(ii) 
yt-1 0.6761** 
1 0.2176**  0.1964** 0.1986** 
   .000
  2  .000   .000   .000 
yt-1 
2 -0.0100**  0.0070**  0.0064**  0.0063** 
   .000   .002   .007   .009 
yt-1 
3 0.0002**  -0.0003**    -0.0003**  -0.0003** 
   .000   .000   .000   .000 
CovShock t-1     -0.4388**  -0.4326** 
       .000   .000 
IndShock t-1   -0.2581**    -0.0028 
     .000     .967 
Distance SK t     0.3089**  0.3061** 
       .000   .000 
Local SK t   0.2234**    
     .000     
Aid t-1 (kg)    -0.0025**  -0.0031**  -0.0031** 
     .000   .000   .000 
Land t (timad = ¼ ha)    0.0009  -0.0005  -0.0006 
     .382   .627   .616 
HH Size t   -0.1818**  -0.1621**  -0.1722** 
     .000   .000   .000 
constant 1.5023  4.0898  4.3208  4.3684 
        
Arellano-Bond test that autocovariance in residuals of order j is 0: 
j=1:   -8.16**  -4.01**  -4.04** 
   .000  .000  .000 
j=2:   -1.00  -1.08  -1.09 
   .316  .279  .277 





Table 5b: Arellano-Bond estimation of livestock asset holdings, including indirect effect of 
social assets on livestock assets 
 D  E(i)  E(ii) 
yt-1 0.2208**  0.2109**  0.2145** 
   .000   .000   .000 
yt-1 
2 0.0059**  0.0060  **  0.0058** 
   .013   .008   .010 
yt-1 
3 -0.0003**  -0.0003*  -0.0003** 
   .000   .000   .000 
CovShock t-1   -0.4736**  -0.4892** 
     .000   .000 
IndShock t-1 -0.3995**    -0.0193 
   .000     .777 
DistSKt * CovShock t-1   0.3062**  0.3026** 
     .000   .000 
LocSKt * IndShock t-1 0.2398**     
   .000     
Aid t-1 (kg)  -0.0027**  -0.0030**  -0.0031** 
   .000   .000   .000 
Land t (timad = ¼ ha)  0.0016  -0.0003  -0.0003 
   .121   .793   .763 
HH Size t -0.1906**  -0.1803**  -0.1907** 
   .000   .000   .000 
constant 4.2924  4.3991  4.4450 
        
Arellano-Bond test that autocovariance in residuals of order j is 0: 
j=1: -4.15**  -4.18**  -4.21** 
   .000  .000  .000 
j=2: -1.05  -1.05  -1.05 





Figure 1: Maps of study area 
Figure 1a: Location of South Wollo Zone and Oromiya Zone in Ethiopia 
 
Source: Shin 2002. 
 




Source: Shin 2002.  
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Figure 4: Asset dynamics reflecting multiple dynamic equilibria 
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[1] Kebeles, also referred to as peasant associations, are administrative units comprising of approximately 4 small 
villages on average. As however often kebeles are referred to as villages, we will use these terms interchangeably. 
 [2] The conversion factors used generating TLUs are: Camel = 1.43; Oxen, cow, heifer, bull and calf = 1; Horse, 
mule, donkey = 0.5; Goat, sheep = 0.1; Chicken = 0.05. 
 [3] Lybbert et al. (2004) use this representation of livestock asset dynamics in pastoral Southern Ethiopia. 
 [4] We will from here forward ignore the village subscript for household-specific variables or parameters for 
notational simplicity. 
[5] The neighborhood of  0
j it y −  can be determined by choosing a smoothing parameter, whereby this parameter 
constitutes the percentage of data points that are to be included in the neighborhood. If the parameter is chosen to be 
large, the relationship between  0
j it y −  and yit will appear very smooth, whereas a very small smoothing parameter 
results in “overfitting”, which can make it difficult to discern a general relationship. 
[6] Among the control variables, a noticeable and perhaps surprising phenomenon is that the negative coefficient on 
food aid appears robustly in all specifications. This is the case despite the fact that both aid and lagged aid are 
treated as sequentially exogenous in the estimation and are thus instrumented for in the GMM framework. 
Furthermore, it is interestingly the lagged variable for which the negative effect is consistently significant. Similar 
results with respect to food aid were found in another study using the same data set (Carter et al. 2005). A further 
paper examining the impact on food aid on welfare in three regions in Ethiopia including South Wollo (Mathys, 
1999) also points in a similar direction (though less pointedly), finding that while in the short term asset sales are 
somewhat reduced with food aid, months later households tend to resort back to elevated sales. While the impact of 
food aid on assets is not central to our paper, the somewhat disheartening results from this and other studies on the 
same region suggest a more in depth look at this question in a way that specific policy insights for the design of food 
aid programs can be gained. 